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A B S T R A C T
_________________________________
This paper examines the current status 
of research regarding under-pricing 
in the Malaysian IPOs. We have 
divided the review of past studies into 
the following categories: investor 
information, the choice of underwriter, 
ownership structure, share lock-up 
period, supply of IPOs, mechanism 
for pricing IPOs, institutional investor 
involvement, and board structure. We 
have shown that there is a noticeable 
decline in initial return over time, 
perhaps due to the strengthening 
of the regulatory environment and 
the ability of investment bankers to 
adequately manage the listing process 
of new issues. Furthermore, based on 
the review of past studies, we have 
managed to pinpoint significant factors 
that influenced the initial return in the 
Malaysian IPO market. Finally, we also 
provide suggestions for future research.
________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction
To go public, a private company must first issue equity securities to outside 
investors, in what is called an initial public offering (IPO). Over the past three 
96                                    The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 13. Number 1, 2017: 95-118
decades, a huge number of theoretical and empirical studies have been published 
on the topic of IPO initial return. Puzzling empirical findings, usually related 
to under-pricing of IPOs,  form the main core of the growing literature on this 
subject. The interesting empirical findings regarding the under-pricing of IPOs 
have motivated researchers to develop various theoretical works that help in 
explaining this puzzling phenomena; many have put forth new hypotheses for 
the reasons for such a puzzle. Consequently, further empirical studies have also 
been motivated to test these new implications that have emerged from various 
theoretical studies.
The puzzle of IPO initial return (specifically, under-pricing of IPOs) is 
considered to be one of the first documented issues regarding the IPO market. 
Among the first empirical studies that tested under-pricing and reported a 
positive mean initial return (which implies the existence of under-pricing) in 
the U.S. IPO market, are Ibbotson (1975), Logue (1973), and Stoll and Curley 
(1970). Even though the puzzle refers to the under-pricing in IPOs, past studies 
on IPOs in the developed markets (especially the US market) also reported that 
the abnormal initial return (or huge under-pricing) was usually followed by 
subsequent negative or insignificant returns in the after-market. Yong (2013) 
also noticed this phenomenon of insignificant returns in the after-market with 
the Malaysian IPOs, namely the IPO prices stabilized in the after-market. In 
an informational efficient market, this under-pricing phenomenon should not 
take place, and that is the reason why explanations are offered to try to explain 
the existence of this so-called puzzle.  Initial return is usually measured as the 
percentage change from the offer price of an IPO to the opening price (or closing 
price) on its first trading day, and the higher the initial return the higher is the 
level of under-pricing.
Ritter (1998) suggested that under-pricing depends on various aspects of 
the relationship between the three most important players in the IPO process, who 
are the investors, the issuers, and the underwriters (or the investment bankers). 
Ritter’s argument was based on the suggestion made by Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
who argued that the greater the uncertainty about the value of the new issue, the 
greater the under-pricing needed to attract the uninformed investors. This means 
that the higher the information asymmetry around the new issues the higher the 
under-pricing would be. Both arguments, in a way, suggested that under-pricing 
is induced when the objectives of the underwriter, issuer and the investors are 
not aligned. The difference between the objectives of the underwriter, issuer and 
subscriber has been further explored by many researchers. Various theoretical 
constructs, linking the objectives of the issuer, underwriter as well as the investors 
have been proposed. These constructs use various existing theories collectively 
and individually like the information asymmetry theory, winner’s curse theory, 
bandwagon theory, book building theory, lawsuit avoidance theory, signalling 
theory, underwriter reputation theory, underwriter’s monopsony power theory, 
ownership dispersion theory, and uncertainty theory.
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The assumption of information asymmetry is the driving force behind 
most theoretical models, the results of which provide support for this hypothesis. 
Scholars have attempted to explain the initial return puzzle using the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. For example, Baron and Holmström (1980) documented 
the existence of information asymmetry between the underwriters and the issuing 
firms, where underwriters are better informed than the issuing firm concerning 
the demand for the issuing firm’s securities. According to them, under-pricing is 
necessary in order to solve this so-called “moral hazard”.
Another potential explanation for under-pricing is related to the information 
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. Rock (1986) assumed 
that the market could be segmented into informed and uninformed investors in 
which the informed have superior information regarding the firm’s value over 
the uninformed as well as the issuing firm itself. These informed investors use 
their superior knowledge to participate only in under-priced issues and stay away 
from overpriced issues. The uninformed investors, on the other hand, randomly 
bid for all issues. As a result, the under-priced issues receive both informed 
and uninformed demand while the overpriced issues receive only uninformed 
demand. The uninformed investors have a lower probability of receiving under-
priced issues in comparison to overpriced issues. Such confusion, according to 
Rock, has resulted in the winner’s curse problem, causing uninformed investors 
to lower their valuation of IPOs and thereby reducing the uninformed demand 
for them. In the absence of any form of compensation, the uninformed investors 
would withdraw from the market due to the bias in allocation. As such, under-
pricing is necessary in order to attract uninformed investors to participate in the 
market.
In the case of the Malaysian IPOs market the level of information 
asymmetry is high due to the significantly weak institutional development,1 
and weak investor protections,2 according to Hemmer and Bardhan (2000) and 
La Porta et al. (2000), respectively. Furthermore, the high level of information 
asymmetry may be caused by the fixed-priced offer mechanism of pricing 
1 Hemmer and Bardhan (2000) argued that the low levels of institutional development 
in the Asian countries were caused by the following: (a) the traditional institutions 
of exchange in developing countries often did not evolve into more complex 
(impersonal, open, legal rational) rules or institutions of enforcement as in early 
modern Europe, (b) the institutional arrangements of a society are often the outcome 
of strategic distributive conflicts among different social groups, and inequality in the 
distribution of power and resources can sometimes block the rearrangement of these 
institutions in ways that are conducive to over-all development. 
2  La Porta et al. (2000) defined investor protections as the ability of the legal system 
(both laws and their enforcement) to protect outside investors (both shareholders and 
creditors) from insiders. Moreover, they showed the effect of investor protections on: 
(a) expanding the financial markets, (b) facilitating external financing of new firms, 
(c) moving away from concentrated ownership and (d) improving the efficiency of 
investment allocation. 
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IPOs, which is commonly practised in Malaysia. With the fixed-price pricing 
mechanism, the offer price is set by the issuing firm before the IPO is offered to 
the investing public (Yong 2011).
The under-pricing puzzle in IPOs has been documented in many different 
countries, where the literature has proven that under-pricing is not exclusive to 
the U.S. market alone. Various researchers in various countries have tested the 
under-pricing phenomenon. Many of these studies have confirmed a positive 
initial return in various markets around the world. This is made possible through 
the latest updated version (16th of February 2015) of Loughran’s et al. (1994) 
table, which contains the average under-pricing history of 52 countries. Loughran 
et al. (1994), for the purpose of analysing the differences between countries and 
within countries, studied the average initial returns in 25 countries covering the 
period of 1960 to 1992. They constructed the table by collecting figures from 
various studies at that time. They concluded that the degree of under-pricing 
varied enormously across countries due to the contractual mechanisms used and 
the characteristics of companies that went public. Furthermore, they argued that 
countries with the highest average initial returns tended to be countries where 
institutional constraints were binding (the average initial return at the time of the 
study for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, China, India and Malaysia were 149%, 239.80%, 
118.40%, 88.5%, 56.20% respectively). Meanwhile, countries with the lowest 
average initial returns, i.e. below 10.0% (e.g. Canada, France, and Netherlands), 
tended to be countries in which most of the firms going public were relatively 
large firms with a long operating history and where the contractual mechanism 
used had auction-like features.
Despite the existence of under-pricing in many countries, the level or 
size of under-pricing, however, varied substantially from country to country, 
determined by different variables in different markets.  In addition, these 
variables varied across time in the same market. Although the variables were not 
similar, three following characteristics were documented across markets: 
1. The short-term under-pricing of IPOs. This is also true in the case of 
Malaysian IPOs. The majority of the studies in Malaysia investigated the 
determinants of IPO under-pricing during the short-term, usually a period 
represented by the first-day of return.  
2. The long-term under-pricing of IPOs. This is a controversial area of 
discussion because there is a tendency for anomalies to disappear once 
they have been identified. Whether this is because the original anomaly 
occurred by chance during some sample period, or because the market 
learns and begins to price securities differently, is unclear. In Malaysia, an 
early study by Dawson (1987) reported a positive long-run performance 
(18.2%) of Malaysian IPOs. Wu (1993) reported that, using data from 
the Main Board from January 1974 to December 1989, IPOs with low 
initial returns performed better than those with high initial returns and 
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small firms tended to out-perform big firms in the long-run. Ismail et al. 
(1993), using data from January 1980 to December 1989, reported that 
returns after the initial listing of IPOs were not significant. Mohamad 
et al. (1994a), using data from 1975 to 1990, reported an average initial 
under-pricing of 135% and significant positive cumulative abnormal 
returns after 2 and 3 years. Yong (1996), using data from January 1990 
to December 1994, reported that the benefits of under-pricing did not 
accrue to the secondary market traders. Nasir and Zin (1998), using the 
Main Board data for the period 1990-1995, reported that insignificant 
price fluctuation after the first-day of trading conformed to the efficient 
market hypothesis. Yong et al. (1999), using IPO listed on the Main 
Board and the Second Board between 1991 and 1995, found that average 
initial returns had no relation with the average annual return over the 
longer-term periods; the only exception was the negatively significant 
correlation between average initial returns and average annual returns 
over a three-year period.
3. The hot issue market phenomenon. In this case an IPO is impacted by the 
extent to which the offer has been under-priced compared to its market 
value; the higher the difference, the higher the subscription as investors 
stand to gain more in the short run. In addition, the timing of the IPO has 
a bearing on the outcome. For example, during the time of optimism, if 
IPOs flood the market every offer is likely to be oversubscribed, as the 
theory of animal instincts would suggest.
2. Under-Pricing in the Malaysian IPO Market
The literature presented in this section documents the considerable decreases 
in the average initial returns over time (specifically, over the years) in the 
Malaysian IPOs market. In the early years, Dawson (1987) reported a 166.6% 
abnormal average initial return in Malaysia using a sample of 21 IPOs from 1978 
to 1983, while another study by Yong (1992) documented an average initial 
return of 167.4%. Ismail et al. (1993) reported an average initial excess return of 
114.6%, using a sample of 63 IPOs from 1980 to 1989. Loughran et al. (1994) 
reported an average initial return of 80.3% using a sample of 132 Malaysian 
IPOs covering the period of 1980 to 1991. Mohamad et al. (1994) examined 
the initial performance of 65 IPOs from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE), covering the period of 1975 to 1990, and found an average initial return 
of 135%. Using a sample of 126 Malaysian IPOs and covering the period of 
1980 to 1991, Isa and Ahmad (1996) documented an initial return of 76.8%, 
which was considered higher than that of other markets. 
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In another study covering Malaysian IPOs, Yong (1997) used a sample of 
224 IPOs to examine the average initial return of the period ranging from 1990 to 
1994. He reported an average initial of 72.85% offer-to-open return, an adjusted 
return of 72.63% offer-to-open return, an average initial of 75.03% offer-to-
close return, and an adjusted return of 74.49% offer-to-close return. Jelic et al. 
(2001) covered a sample of 182 Malaysian IPOs from 1980 to 1995 and reported 
an average initial return of 99.25%. Furthermore, at the same period, Yong et 
al. (2001) documented an average initial return of 81.6%, through covering all 
issues in both the Main Board and the Second Board of the KLSE, from January 
1991 to December 1995. 
In a more recently published study, Mohd Rashid et al. (2014) focused 
on the issue of the lock-up period within the Malaysian IPO market and its 
relationship with IPO under-pricing from January 2000 to December 2012, by 
taking into consideration both the ratio and the duration of the lock-up. They 
reported an average initial return of 29%, which was lower than previous reports 
in the literature.
Table 1 presents past studies that examined IPO initial returns in the 
Malaysian market. Furthermore, Figure 1 accounts for the initial return taken 
from various study periods. It is evident from Figure 1 that there is a noticeable 
decline in initial return over time, perhaps due to the strengthening of the 
regulatory environment and the ability of investment bankers to adequately 
manage the listing process of new issues. Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008) 
attribute the declining trend in the initial performance of IPOs in the Malaysian 
market to the SC’s decision to liberalise the IPO pricing mechanism in 1996 
and due to the various measurements taken by the SC and the Malaysian 
government to counteract the adverse effects of the 1997/1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis. However, the average initial return in Malaysia is still high according to 
Figure 1. The most recently published study on initial return, by Yong (2015), 
reported an average initial return of around 35% during the period 2009-2013. 
This finding indicates that the average initial return of the Malaysian IPO market 
is still quite high; perhaps due to the “still” high level of information asymmetry 
in the Malaysian ‎IPO market.
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Dawson (1987) 1978-1983 21 166.70 *
Yong (1992) (Note: This 
is a better version of that 
article published in Jurnal 
Pengurusan.
I attached a copy of that
article)
1983-1988 33 167.40 *
Ku Ismail et al. (1993) 1980-1989 63 114.60 *
Yong (1997) 1990- 1994 224 72.85 Over-subscription ratio
How et al. (2007) 1989-2000 322 101.57 Regulation, multiple, uses and 
technology
Jelic et al. (2001) 1980-1995 182 99.25 LnBV/MV (spell out in full), 
Market, Dmultiple (spell 
out in full) and underwriters 
reputation 
Paudyal et al. (1998) 1984-1995 98 61.80 Over-subscription ratio, 
market volatility, underwriters 
reputation and ex-ante risk
Moshirian et al. (2010) 1991-2008 708 61.81 *
Yong and Isa (2003) 1990-1998 468 95 Over-subscription ratio
Hiau Abdullah and 
TaufilMohd (2004)
1991-1998 539 78.44 Company size, indigenous 
population ownership and 
substantial shareholder losses
Wan Hussin (2005) 1996-2000 154 83 Offer, demand, lock-up and 
Dlock-up (spell out in full)
Abdul Rahim and Yong 
(2008)
1999-2007 386 31.99 Offer size, demand, company 
size, offer type and season
Low and Yong (2011) 2000-2007 368 30.83 Over-subscription ratio, offer 
size, issue size, opportunity 
cost of fund, IPO volume 
dummy
Yong (2011) 2001-2009 370 26.34 Private placements
Abdul Rahim and Yong 
(2010)
1999-2007 386 31.99 Demand and offer type
Mohd Rashid et al. (2014) 2000-2012 495 29 Lock-up period, shareholder 
retention and potentials of 
follow-on offerings 
Yong (2015) 2009-2013 93 35.93 First-day price-spread, ratio of 
first-day volume over total unit 
offered, offer price, hot versus 
cold IPOs and listing board
Notes. (1) The asterisk (*) indicates that the study focuses only on the initial return.  
(2) The hashtag (#) indicates that the study is based on abstracts.  
Source: Published articles as compiled by the authors.
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Figure 1. Average Initial Return of the Malaysian IPO Market
3. Significant Variables in Determining Under-Pricing in Malaysia
Various studies on Malaysian IPOs have managed to pinpoint significant factors 
that influence the initial return. To make the discussion more focused, in this 
section we divide the review of past studies into the following categories: 
investor Information, the choice of underwriter, ownership structure, share lock-
up period, supply of IPOs, mechanism for pricing IPOs, and institutional investor 
involvement. Paudyal et al. (1998) documented that certain variables (market 
volatility, over-subscription, ex-ante risk, underwriter reputation, and sector 
dummy) were significantly related to IPO initial excess return. Furthermore, 
How et al. (2007) found that users, multiple, technology, and regulation were 
the significant factors in explaining IPO initial return. In a more recent study, 
Badru and Ahmad Zaluki (2018) reported that for ex-ante variables, such as IPO 
risk, company size, the Altman Z-score measure of pre-IPO performance, audit 
quality and the technology industry, were significantly related to IPO initial 
returns.
3.1 Investor Information  
In most countries, a prospectus, detailing specific and relevant information about 
a company, is required to be given to investors prior to the issuance of IPO. 
Many stock exchanges require that the company seeking listing on their stock 
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financial or accounting data for the last few years. Many of the past IPO studies 
attempted to find the relationship between these pieces of information and the 
initial return of the IPO. Variables such as firm age, profitability, number of 
shares to be sold, size of the firm, partial adjustment phenomenon and insider 
sales were the types of variables that had been studied. Many of these variables 
tended to be related to the level of under-pricing of IPOs. In Malaysia, an 
exception though, Mohamad et al. (1994b) who examined the accuracy of profit 
forecasts reported in the prospectuses of Malaysian IPOs found that there was no 
significant relationship between the forecast errors and the stock price premium 
(or the level of under-pricing) upon listing.
Early studies by Yong et al. (1999) and Yong and Zaidi (2003) 
documented that over-subscription ratio or investor demand for IPO was a 
variable that consistently explained the levels of initial return in Malaysian 
IPOs. According to Yong (2007a), investor demand is considered unique to the 
Malaysian IPO market due to the use of the fixed-price mechanism in setting the 
offer price. Under the fixed-price mechanism, information on investor demand 
is available to the general investing public in the form of IPO over-subscription 
ratio. Issuing firms rely on the over-subscription ratio to get information on 
IPO market demand because in the fixed price method, issuers do not have the 
opportunity to interact and gather information from potential investors (Low & 
Yong, 2011). Furthermore, Vong (2006) argued that investor demand plays an 
important role in an IPO success because it reflects direct information regarding 
the market’s reaction to the IPO. For example, a highly demanded IPO offers a 
better opportunity for the firm to sell shares in the future due to the reputation 
gained from the highly over-subscription ratio (Vong, 2006), which enhances 
the liquidity of the newly listed stock (Alanazi et al., 2016; Loughran and Ritter, 
1995). The enhanced liquidity enables the company to raise capital on more 
favourable terms in the future rather than having to compensate investors for the 
lack of liquidity (Ritter, 1998).
In his paper, Yong (2007a) covered more variables that were available to 
the public before the listing date of IPOs (i.e. over-subscription ratio, number of 
days from last day of application of IPO to the listing day, number of days of offer 
period, offer size and offer price), for the study period between January 1999 and 
December 2003. Individually, all these variables contributed significantly to the 
levels of initial return, the with over-subscription ratio contributing the most. 
When a stepwise regression analysis was run, in general, the over-subscription 
ratio alone could explain much of the levels of initial return in Malaysian IPOs. 
Jelic et al. (2001) found that the natural logarithm of the length of operating 
history and the logarithm of net tangible asset per share over the first-day closing 
price was significantly related to the market adjusted initial return. Meanwhile, 
Yong and Isa (2003) showed that only the over-subscription variable contributed 
significantly to the IPO initial return. Wan-Hussin (2005), on the other hand, 
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found that owner participation ratio was negatively associated with under-
pricing (or initial return) and the fractions of directors’ shares that were locked-
up were positively related to under-pricing. Furthermore, Wan-Hussin (2005) 
reported that demand (over-subscription ratio), offer size, and lock-up period 
were significantly related to under-pricing. Jelic et al. (2001) used market 
adjusted initial return as a dependent variable, and found that over-subscription 
ratio, the market condition of three months before issue, demand, and book-
to-market value ratio were significant in explaining the market adjusted initial 
return. Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010) used a sample of Malaysian IPOs and 
Shari›a-compliant IPOs to study under-pricing, and they found a significant 
relationship between the over-subscription ratio and the size of offer with 
the initial return. Yong (2011) found that the initial return was higher with a 
larger percentage of private placement IPO, in which he suggested that there 
was a “bandwagon effect” taking place, where uninformed investors follow the 
action of the informed investors when it comes to participating (or follow the 
bandwagon) in an IPO exercise. 
3.2 The Choice of Underwriter
Underwriter reputation is considered to be one of the major influencing factors 
on the initial performance of IPOs (Kenourgios et al., 2007; Dimovski et al., 
2011). The empirical evidence seems to suggest that underwriters with a better 
reputation tend to reduce the initial under-pricing (see, for example, Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), Johnson and Miller (1988), Beatty and Welch (1996), Carter et al. 
(1998) and Paudyal et al. (1998)). However, in the Malaysian context, very few 
studies have investigated the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
IPO initial return. Paudyal et al. (1998) documented that long-term investments 
were significantly better for new issuing firms with reputed underwriters than 
those with less reputed underwriters. Jelic et al. (2001) covered a sample of 
182 Malaysian IPOs from 1980 to 1995 and reported an average initial return 
of 99.25%. They concluded that there was no significant relationship between 
underwriter reputation and initial returns due to the lack of competition between 
underwriters. Yatim (2011) reported a positive relationship between the 
reputation of investment banks and under-pricing. Her study covered 385 IPOs 
from October 1999 to February 2008. 
Tong and Ahmad (2015) reported a negative relationship between 
underwriter reputation (Big 5 underwriters) and under-pricing, which means 
that the higher the reputation of an underwriter, the lower the level of under-
pricing. Their study covered 322 IPOs, from January 2002 to December 2008. 
However, Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2016) found that IPOs underwritten by 
the Big 5 underwriters that had high market share and charged low underwriting 
spread experienced higher levels of under-pricing. Furthermore, they reported 
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that under-pricing increased with IPOs with biased earnings forecasts. Finally, 
they revealed that the more accurate the earnings forecasts were, the more 
minimised would the asymmetric information be and hence, the less would 
the IPO under-pricing be. Previous studies have investigated the relationship 
between underwriter reputation and under-pricing. However, the empirical 
findings were mixed. Underwriter reputation was reported to have a positive 
(Dimovski & Brooks 2008; Kenourgios et al., 2007) and negative (Jelic et al., 
2001; Neuberger & Chapelle, 1983) relationship with initial return. Beatty 
and Welch (1996) showed that the relationship between IPO under-pricing 
and underwriter reputation had shifted from a negative to a positive one. They 
explained this change was a result of the aspect of different economic conditions 
during different periods.
3.3 Ownership Structure 
With an IPO, the ownership structure will change and the shares sold in the IPO 
are designated as Primary shares (or Public Issue in the context of Malaysian 
IPOs), which are new shares, and Secondary shares (or Offer for Sale as it is 
known in Malaysia), which are shares that were previously owned by existing 
shareholders, usually founders and managers of the firm. The size of the new 
issue relative to the existing shares and their distribution will change the 
ownership structure. Ritter (1998) reported that most of the firms that were going 
public would offer around 20%–40% of their shares to the public, while the pre-
IPO shareholders would retain the rest of the shares. Going for IPO is considered 
a critical phase in separating ownership and firm control.
The availability of some unique features in the Malaysian IPO market 
caused it to be different from other markets in the world. One of those unique 
features was caused by the New Economic Policy instrument that was introduced 
by the Malaysian government in the 1970s. The main objective of such a policy 
was to improve Malaysian (Bumiputera) investor’s participation and ownership 
in the equity market. To implement this objective, starting from 1976, each 
company that seeks listing on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
must allocate 30% of its total issued shares to Bumiputera and that can be done 
directly or through Bumiputera institutions (institutions catering for Malays 
only) such as unit trusts launched by the National Equity Corporation (Permodan 
Nasional Berhad). On the 1st of November 2012 under the “Bumiputera Equity 
Requirements For Public Listed Companies”, the Securities Commission (SC) 
announced that corporations seeking a listing on the Main Market must allocate 
at least 12.5% of their enlarged issued and paid-up share capital to Bumiputera 
investors.
Saadouni et al. (2005), using 322 IPOs listed on the Second Board for 
the period 1989-2000, found that under-pricing was inversely related to the 
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proportion of shares allocated to Bumiputera investors. On average, Bumiputera 
investors and the Malaysian public are allocated almost an equal proportion 
and make similar profits per issue. However, institutional Bumiputera investors 
appear to be allocated a higher proportion of the over-priced issues than the most 
under-priced ones. How et al. (2007) analysed share allocations in the Malaysian 
Second Board IPOs market, covering 322 IPOs from 1989 to 2000. They found 
that Bumiputera investors and the Malaysian public received almost an equal 
allocation and made similar profits per issue. Furthermore, they documented that 
IPOs with a higher share allocation to retail Bumiputera investors performed 
better in both the short and long run.
3.4 Share Lock-Up Period 
Lock-up period refers to a period where insiders are prohibited from selling 
shares without the written permission of the lead underwriter. In the US, the 
average period is 180 days or 6 months.  The lock-up provision is an attempt to 
control the supply of shares sold during the period after the IPO by the insiders 
or the existing shareholders. Mohan and Chen (2001) and Brav and Gompers 
(2003) argued that the structure of the lock-up agreements reflects the degree 
of the adverse selection or moral hazard problem, and thus resulting in IPOs 
being under-priced. In Malaysia, share lock-up is commonly known as share 
moratorium. The lock-up (share moratorium) agreement was made mandatory 
for particular new issuers in the Malaysian IPO market starting from May 3, 1999. 
In the following years, the IPO agreement went through several amendments, 
with significant changes in the lock-up agreement occurring in 2003, 2008, and 
2009. The revisions of 2009 were the most restrictive and vigilant on lock-up 
agreement, in which most of these changes were made to protect investors’ 
interests. This enforcement of the lock-up agreement differentiates the Malaysian 
IPO market from the rest of the world, especially the U.S. and the U.K. IPO 
markets. In developed countries the implementation of the lock-up agreement 
is built on a voluntary basis that depends on the outcomes of the negotiations 
between the insiders of the IPO company and the investment bank. According to 
Wan-Hussin (2005), there had not been enough empirical attention on the lock-
up period in Malaysia, even though there was a huge emphasis on the lock-up 
period by the Malaysian SC.
Mohan and Chen (2002) and Wan-Hussin (2005) were among the early 
studies that discussed the relationship between lock-up period and initial return 
in Malaysia. Both studies came to the same agreement in the case of Malaysia, 
namely specific companies or industries characterised with relatively higher risk 
than the traditional norm in the market were imposed with a lock-up period to 
protect the investors. They also concluded that both higher lock-up ratios and a 
longer lock-up period were signals for increased risk, which resulted in higher 
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initial return. During the period of his study, Wan Hussin stated that major 
shareholders were not allowed to sell 45 percent of IPOs within one year, and 
in every subsequent year, they were allowed to dispose one third of the shares 
that were under the moratorium. Mohd Rashid et al. (2014) reported in their 
study that based on the risk-signalling hypothesis it could be concluded that both 
the lock-up ratio and lock-up period had positives relationship with the initial 
return in the Malaysian IPOs market. In their study, they showed that the effect 
of the lock-up period was more pronounced than the effect of the lock-up ratio, 
which they considered to be preliminary. They documented that both the lock-up 
period and the lock-up ratio were more appropriate for signalling the quality ‎of 
the issuing firm than the risk of the issuing firm. Furthermore, they concluded 
that the relationship with the initial return was more pronounced in the case 
of lock-up periods rather than lock-up ratios, and lock-up periods were more 
appropriate for signalling the quality of the firm. 
Recent studies regarding the lock-period are more interested in 
investigating the effect of the lock-up provisions on trading volume changes 
around the lock-up expiry date (Zameni & Yong 2016) and on trading volume 
changes around the lock-up expiry date (Zameni & Yong 2016). Zameni and 
Yong (2016) reported a positive abnormal trading volume at the lock-up expiry 
date for IPO market, except for the ACE market, the construction sector and 
the technology sector, where it was negative. They argued that the high trading 
volume at and around the lock-up expiration is compatible with shareholders’ 
selling due to diversification reasons and wealth recognition and which is also 
an indication of insiders’ lack of confidence about a company’s future prospects. 
Furthermore, the significant negative trading volume can be interpreted in a 
way that insiders of those related boards and sectors do not sell their shares 
significantly but would rather watch what would happen to the market and are 
optimistic about the market’s future. Zameni and Yong (2017) documented that 
the share price drop around the lock-up expiry was due to the increase in the 
adverse selection element of the bid–ask spread, which resulted from the trading 
volume increase around the lock-up expiry.
Supply of IPOs:
Supply of IPOs is built on the assumption that investors do not consider the IPOs 
of all firms as equally the same; by doing so, they discriminate IPOs based on a 
firm’s characteristics, thus lowering the IPO initial return as the supply of IPOs 
increase. The offer size (OFFSZ) is used to measure the IPO supply, which is 
represented as 
OFFSZ = In (NOSHIxPOFFER)
108                                    The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 13. Number 1, 2017: 95-118
where,  ln = natural logarithm, NOSHI = total number of shares 
issued, and  POFFER = offer price. 
Yong (2007a) used offer size as a variable to explain the level of under-
pricing in the Malaysian IPOs, and concluded that it was quite significant in 
explaining the under-pricing level. The Malaysian literature has reported a 
negative relationship between the supply of IPOs and initial return, which means 
the smaller the supply, the higher the level of under-pricing. This negative 
correlation is fuelled by the smaller supply of shares that leads to greater pressure 
on initial return (Abdul-Rahim & Yong, 2010; Yong, 2007a, Yong., 2009, Mohd 
Rashid et al., 2014). Abdul-Rahim and Che-Embi (2013) used a sample of 384 
IPOs from January 1999 to December 2008 to investigate the different factors 
that influence the initial returns of Shariah versus non-Shariah IPOs. They found 
that the unlike the initial returns of the non-Shariah IPOs, the initial returns of 
the Shariah IPOs were also explained by the offer size.
3.5 Mechanism for Pricing IPOs
Three mechanisms are used in IPOs around the world, namely auctions, fixed-
priced offers, and book building. In auctions the market-clearing price is 
determined after bids are submitted. In a fixed-price offer, the price is set prior 
to the allocation. If there is excess demand, shares are rationed on a pro rata 
or lottery basis.  In book building, the underwriter solicits the opinion of the 
potential investors regarding the offer price through their bids and then ‎sets an 
offer price. 
The most common mechanism by which IPOs are sold around the world 
is building. Auctioned IPOs in France, Israel, Japan, Taiwan and the US are 
associated with low but positive initial returns, compared with fixed-price offers 
and book building IPO sale regimes. In Malaysia the fixed-priced mechanism 
is the most popular practice when it comes to pricing an offer price (Low & 
Yong, 2013; Yong, 2015). In a fixed-price method, the offer price of the issue 
is set prior to the listing by the issuing firm. However, the settled price does not 
reflect the true value of the listing firm’s issues because prospective investors are 
not given the opportunity to reflect their expectations and beliefs regarding the 
offer price of the IPO, unlike the book building and auction methods that allow 
investors to be solicited by the issuers regarding the value of the IPO before the 
offer price is set. Not factoring the prospective investors in the offer price will 
lead to heterogeneity of opinion among investors (Yong, 2015; Chowdhry & 
Sherman, 1996). This heterogeneity is the repercussion of the divergent prior 
expectations the prospective investors have regarding the true value of the listing 
firm. This heterogeneity has important behavioural implications (Miller, 1977; 
Goldberg & Nitzsch, 2001), where investors’ interpret the information as they 
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see fit. This will likely affect their willingness to buy or sell the IPO, and the 
overall investors’ decisions are reflected in the range of trading prices, as shown 
by the first-day price spread (Yong, 2015; Low & Yong, 2013), which lead to 
increase in the under-pricing.
Yong (2015) and Low and Yong (2013) documented a significant 
relationship between under-pricing and first-day price spread. They argued that 
the higher the under-pricing the higher the heterogeneous beliefs among investors. 
Yong (2015) investigated the relationship between investor heterogeneity and 
initial return, ratio of first-day volume over total units offered, and listing board. 
He concluded that IPOs that were characterised with high initial return, high 
first-day trading volume, and listed on the ACE Market suffered from very high 
divergence of opinions regarding their true values among the investors due to 
their speculative nature. Moreover, Low and Yong (2013) documented IPOs that 
were highly under-priced, small in offer size and were listed on the MESDAQ 
Market tended to have a high level of heterogeneous beliefs among investors.
3.6 Institutional Investor Involvement 
In the context of the institutional investors versus retail investors, in Malaysia, 
IPOs are categorised into two main groups, namely the private placement and the 
non-private placement. With private placement, IPOs are offered directly to the 
institutional investors, who are considered in the finance literature as informed 
investors. Non-private placement IPOs are offered to retail investors, who on 
the other hand, are considered to be the so-called uninformed investors. The 
winner’s curse hypothesis suggested by Rock (1986) posits that IPOs involving 
more institutional investors are seen to be less risky investments and accordingly 
require lower initial return. The results of a study by Yong (2011) indicated 
that, probably due to fear of being trapped in the winner’s curse situation, the 
lack of informed institutional investors in an IPO exercise was compensated 
with higher initial returns (or higher level of under-pricing). Yong (2011) 
used 370 IPOs covering the period from January 2001 to December 2009 to 
investigate the issues of winner’s curse and bandwagon effect in explaining the 
under-pricing phenomenon of Malaysian IPOs. He concluded that the average 
initial return for the Malaysian private placement IPOs (a proxy for informed 
investors) was significantly lower than that of the non-private placement IPOs 
(a proxy for uninformed investors), which gives support to the winner’s curse 
hypothesis, where uninformed investors demand a higher initial return in the 
absence of informed investors. This finding is further supported by Mohd 
Rashid et al. (2014) who concluded that institutional investor participation had 
a significantly negative coefficient, indicating that uninformed investors (non-
private placement subscribers) tended to demand higher initial returns compared 
to informed investors (private placement subscribers). Finally, on the issue of 
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IPO flipping (the immediate selling of an IPO by the successful subscribers upon 
IPO listing in the open market), Che-Yahya et al. (2014) examined the influence 
of institutional investors’ participation in the flipping activity of Malaysian IPOs. 
They concluded that greater participation of institutional investors during an IPO 
is expected to be an effective strategy to control aggressive flipping activity; 
this means that greater participation of institutional investors during an IPO is 
expected to be an effective strategy to control aggressive flipping activity.
3.7 Board Structure 
The purpose and effectiveness of the board of directors have been described 
by various theories in multiple disciplines. A few of these theories which have 
dominated board research are the stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 
1994), institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), social network theory (Burt, 1992) and resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). These theories may seem random and different, 
but all of them agree on one thing, namely firm outcomes (performance) are 
affected by the concrete actions and activities performed by the boards. Certo 
(2003) extended the literature by showing that board characteristics have a 
symbolic role that is independent of the board’s tangible activities and have 
the ability to influence the performance of the issuing firms in the contexts of 
IPOs. Certo (2003) concluded that board structure features represent significant 
nonfinancial information that IPO investors should take into consideration when 
making investment decisions. In this review paper, we only focused on two 
board structure features, namely the board reputation and the board size. 
In the case of Malaysia, Yatim (2011) examined the relationship between 
board structure and initial return using 385 IPOs from 1999 to 2008. In her study, 
she looked at four board structure variables, which were board independence, 
dual leadership structure, board reputation, and board size. She concluded that 
due to the risky nature of IPO firms, Malaysian investors did not favour the 
separation of board chair and CEO positions, instead preferred stability and 
continuity in executive leadership. This resulted in a positive and significant 
relationship between board reputation, and initial returns. However, Yatim 
(2011) reported a negative correlation between board reputation and the initial 
return. Finally, both board size and board independence were not significantly 
correlated with the initial returns. In a more recent study, Badru et al. (2017) 
examined the impact of board characteristics on the amount of capital raised 
through an IPO from a sample of 220 Malaysian IPOs over the period of 2005 
to 2015. Using the OLS regression, they reported that boards with ethnic Malay 
directors had a significant and positive association with the amount of capital 
raised, while a weak significance was found for board size. However, using 
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the robust regression techniques, they managed to document that other than 
board ethnicity, other board characteristics, namely board size, board 
independence and CEO duality were significantly associated with the amount 
of capital raised
4. Suggestions for Future Research
Throughout this paper we have managed to identify several areas that future 
research can cover to bring the Malaysian literature closer to understanding what 
causes under-pricing and how it can be minimised. In fact, many of the studies 
conducted in the developed markets can be further examined in the context of a 
developing market like Malaysia. For starters, future research can examine the 
regulatory environment (Yong, 2007b) such as the listing requirements for IPOs 
(Moshirian et al., 2010; Jelic et al., 2001), and legal investors’ protection (Liu 
et al., 2014; Espenlaub et al., 2016), and how these issues influence the under-
pricing levels of Malaysian IPOs. 
As suggested by Yong (2007b), in the context of Asian IPOs, future 
research should also look at the influence of the differences in Malaysian laws 
(related to the issuance of IPOs or IPO in general) and their enforcement, on the 
level of under-pricing.  A few studies touched on these issues, such as Banerjee 
et al. (2011) and Espenlaub et al. (2016), however, these studies investigated 
Malaysia as a part of a cross-country study. There are a few studies that focused 
entirely on those issues in the Malaysian IPO market, such as Saadouni et al. 
(2005) who reported that the change in regulation to in a market-based pricing 
mechanism in 1996 had an “adverse effect” on under-pricing, namely IPOs listed 
before the change in regulatory environment were significantly less under-priced 
than those listed after the change. 
Malaysia is one of the leading countries when it comes to Islamic 
finance. However, only a few studies, such as that of Abdul-Rahim and Yong 
(2008), Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010) and Abdul-Rahim and Che-Embi (2013) 
attempted to examine the influence of the Sharia-compliant status on the IPO 
under-pricing. Future research should identify more predictive variables that 
may explain the initial returns (or under-pricing) in the Malaysian IPO market 
with a focus on the implications of the Sharia-compliant status. 
Finally, the marketing of IPOs is another area of research that needs 
serious attention from researchers in Malaysia. Regarding this issue, research can 
be conducted on the issue related to under-pricing of IPOs as a “marketing tool” 
to promote the new listing of a company. This issue was raised by Yong (2007b), 
but, to date, no research has been conducted on this issue in the Malaysian IPO 
market.
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5. Concluding Remarks
This paper aimed to review the issues surrounding the under-pricing of the 
Malaysian IPOs. We put forth the idea that information asymmetry was the 
main cause of under-pricing in the Malaysian IPO market. We also proposed 
that the information symmetry was caused by the use of fixed-price mechanism 
in pricing the IPOs as well as the weak institutional development, and weak 
investor protection. These factors caused a miscommunication among the three 
most important players in the IPO process; the investors, the issuers and the 
underwriters. According to Ritter (1998) this information asymmetry is the main 
cause of under-pricing. However, the level of information asymmetry in the 
Malaysian IPO market has reduced dramatically through the last decade as shown 
in Figure 1. This reduction was perhaps due to the SC’s decision to liberalise the 
IPO pricing mechanism in 1996 and due to the various measurements taken 
by the SC and the Malaysian government to counteract the adverse effect of 
the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis. The Asian Financial Crisis helped the 
Malaysian capital market to develop a better regulatory framework and a 
stronger infrastructure. Malaysia was able to do so through several initiatives to 
facilitate the recovery process. For example, to mitigate the financial crisis, the 
SC introduced the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2000 
(latest revision 2007). For strengthening the standards of investor protection, 
the SC issued the Capital Market Master Plan (CMP) in 2001, which focuses 
on enhancing disclosure and governance standards. The Malaysian government 
introduced the Third Outline Perspective Plan 2001-2010 (OPP3) in April 2001, 
which promotes the idea of leapfrogging to a knowledge economy. Finally, 
Malaysia’s Capital Market Master Plan was drafted to guide the development 
of Malaysia’s capital markets during the decade 2001-2010. The CMP laid 
out a structured and comprehensive reform plan that sought to establish new 
markets, asset classes and intermediaries, and to strengthen existing ones. The 
CMP was developed with a view toward establishing domestic capital markets 
that would be internationally competitive and meet the needs of domestic issuers 
and investors and facilitate long-term economic growth in line with Malaysia’s 
national development plans.
In this paper, based on the review of past studies, we managed to pinpoint 
significant factors that influenced the initial return in the Malaysian IPO market. 
In order to make the discussion more focused, we divided the review of the past 
studies into the following categories: investor Information, choice of underwriter, 
ownership structure, share lock-up period, supply of IPOs, mechanism for 
pricing IPOs, institutional investor involvement, and board structure. The review 
of past studies indicated that under-pricing is still a phenomenon that lingers in 
the Malaysian IPO market, but not as high as it used to be.  Different studies have 
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used different methods to identify the determinants of under-pricing, however, 
a definitive explanation of the IPO under-pricing anomaly remains a source of 
debate, specifically in the context of Malaysian IPOs, and research in IPOs in 
general. The reasons for this inconsistency in the results are due to factors such as 
the sample size used, selection of the IPO market, sample period, measurements 
of the study variables and models used by the researchers. As a result, the IPO 
literature has yet to come to a conclusion regarding the principle theoretical 
reason for under-pricing, and only a few studies really explain the importance of 
the different views regarding under-pricing (Ritter & Welch 2002). 
We end this paper by providing some suggestions regarding possible 
future research on Malaysian IPOs. We, however, do not claim that the list is 
complete.  In fact, any research on IPOs conducted in the developed markets 
can be carried out here provided the data are available and the storyline is worth 
pursuing. 
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